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Abstract 
In order to stimulate private spending and curb pollution, the Chinese government has decided to offer financial 
subsidy to carry out home-appliance replacement from June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2010.  Because the financial subsidy 
can be offered until May 31, 2010, the manufacturer must face the problem: if the government stops to offer the 
financial subsidy, whether to continue the home-appliance replacement or not? If continue to carry out the home-
appliance replacement, the manufacturer should give the payment to the replacement consumer. In this case, there is a 
potential risk for the manufacturer: the unit cost of the new product will increase. In this paper, we studied the price 
decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer under two cases: case I, the government offers the financial subsidy 
which is depended on the retail price; case II, the government stops to offer the financial subsidy, the manufacturer 
will share the payment with the retailer. At the same time, we analyze the impacts of the subsidizing rate and the 
sharing ratio on the optimal results by a numerical example. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [name organizer] 
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1. Introduction 
Nowadays, the home-appliance replacement has become a hot topic. The Chinese government has 
decided to offer financial subsidy to carry out home-appliance replacement from June 1, 2009 to May 31, 
2010. It is the subsidy of the home-appliance replacement that increases the replacement amount and the 
new product demand, and the manufacturer can get more profit. But the situation will be changed after 
May 31, 2010. So, the manufacturer must face a problem: if the government stops to offer the financial 
subsidy, whether to continue the home-appliance replacement or not? If continue to carry out the home-
© 2011 Published by Elsevier B.V.  Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of ICAPIE Organization 
Committee. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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appliance replacement, the manufacturer must be responsible for the subsidy by giving the payment to the 
replacement consumer. In this case, there is a potential risk for the manufacturer: the unit cost of the new 
product will increase. How to control the risk is an important problem, too. 
In order to solve these problems, we will give the price decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer 
in two cases: case I, the government offers the financial subsidy which is depended on the retail price; 
case II, the government stops to offer the financial subsidy, the manufacturer will share the payment with 
the retailer. At the same time, we analyze the impacts of the subsidizing rate and the sharing ratio on the 
optimal results by a numerical example. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we review the literature about the price decisions for 
product replacement.  In section III, we will show and analyze the price decisions for the new product 
under two cases. In section IV, we will give a numerical example and analyze the optimal results. We 
summarize our results in section V. 
2. Literature Review 
The literature related to our study is about the trade-in rebates and cost allocating. For the trade-in 
rebates, Saibal et al studied the optimal pricing/trade-in strategies for durable, remanufacturable products. 
The model they gave can help the managers to determine the optimal price for new customers and the 
optimal trade-in rebate for replacement customers, for quite a general class of age-profile distributions [1]. 
Fudenberg and Tirole, Levinthal and Purohit studied the issues related to monopoly pricing and/or 
production policies of successive generations of a product. Their study is based on a two-period 
framework, and in the second period, the manager should decide to offer trade-in rebates for upgrades to 
repeat purchasers or to buyback some of the old models [2][3]. Fei analyzed and compared the trade-in 
strategy which manufacturers carry out and the trade-in subsidies the government carries out, concluded 
that the policy of the government is more conductive to the expansion of consumer demand for electrical 
household appliances [4]. In the work of [5-7], the authors addressed how individual customers make 
their replacement decisions based on the “mental book value” of their current product and their utility for 
the new product. 
For the cost allocating, Wei gives a scheme by allocating part of the cost of the investment to other 
divisions [8]. Toktay and Wei assume that manufacturing and remanufacturing operations are undertaken 
by two separate divisions, the new and remanufactured products are sold to different market segments 
that do not overlap. They propose a mechanism that achieves optimality in a decentralized system with 
two self-interested decision-makers who are responsible for the two processes respectively. This 
mechanism is a cost allocation mechanism that allocates a portion of the initial production cost of the 
product to each of the two stages of the product life-cycle [9]. In reference [9], they focus on the new 
products and the remanufactured product. In the work of [10], Gu and Gao analyzed the investment risk 
for upgrade-products, gave the control strategy for the investment risk by allocating the investment cost at 
two stages: manufacturing stage and remanufacturing stage. Based on the strategy, the price decisions of 
the upgrade-product’s sale price and the used-product’s collecting price, the demand of the upgrade-
products and the supply of the used-products, and the profits of the two stages are presented. The 
reasonable investment cost allocation ratio is shown to ensure the growth of the total profit. 
Comparing with the above literatures, our study in this paper has the following features: For the price 
decisions, we consider the subsidy which is depended on the retail price and the payment sharing between 
the manufacturer and the retailer. 
3. Price Decisions 
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In this section, we will give the price decisions under two cases: In case I, the manufacture produce 
new products and the retailer sell the new products in the consumer market, the government will offer the 
financial subsidy to stimulate the home-appliance replacement. In case II, the manufacture makes new 
products and the retailer sells the new products in the consumer market, the government stops to offer the 
financial subsidy. In order to maintain the consumer market, the manufacturer will continue the home-
appliance replacement by offering a payment to the replacement consumer. 
3.1 Assumptions and Notations. 
In order to facilitate the analysis, the following assumptions are postulated. Assumption 1, the 
manufacturer has the same unit manufacturing cost of a new product in each case and the retailer has the 
same unit operating cost when the retailer sells a new product. Assumption 2, the manufacturer has 
sufficient channel power over the retailer to act as a Stackelberg leader in each case. Assumption 3, the 
manufacturer should offer the payment that equals to the subsidy when the government stops the subsidy. 
The notations used in this paper are shown as bellow. 
Variables: 
mm pp 21 , : The unit wholesale price of the new product in case I and case II respectively. 
rr pp 21 , : The unit retail price of the new product in case I and case II respectively. 
Costs:
mc : The unit manufacturing cost of a new product used in each case. 
rc : The unit operating cost when the retailer sells a new product in each case. 
Parameters: 
)( 11 rpD : The demand for new products used in case I, sppD rr ωβφ +−= 111 )( . It is a decrease 
function of the retail price and an increase function of the subsidy s which depends on the retail price, 
rps 1α= , 10 <≤α , α is the subsidized rate. ω  means the sensitivity coefficient of the consumer for the 
subsidy (or payment used in case II) . φ and β  being positive parameters and mcβφ > . φ  means the 
potential market of the original products and β  means the sensitivity coefficient of the end-customer for 
the sale price. 
)( 22 rpD : The demand for new products used in case II, 1222 )( sppD rr ωβφ +−= . It is a decrease 
function of the retail price and an increase function of the payment 1s which depends on the retail price, 
here rps 21 α= .
γ : The manufacturer’s share ratio of the payment used in case II. 
mm 21 ,ΠΠ : The total profit of the Manufacturer used in each case respectively. 
rr 21 ,ΠΠ : The total profit of the Retailer used in each case respectively. 
3.2 Price Decision for Case I. 
In this case, the manufacturer’s problem is to maximize his profit by deciding the wholesale price and 
the retailer’s problem is to maximize her profit by deciding the retail price, their problems are shown as 
equation (1) and (2). 
).)(( 1111
1
rrmmmp
ppcpMax
m
ωαβφ +−−=Π          (1) 
).)(( 11111
1
rrmrrrp
pppcpMax
r
ωαβφ +−−−=Π   (2) 
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Here, ωαβ -  should not be zero. 
In terms of the assumption 2, it is easy to get the optimal results of the wholesale price and the retail 
price of case I: 
)).(2/()))(((*1 ωαβωαβφ −−−+= rmm ccp     (3) 
)).(4/()))((3(*1 ωαβωαβφ −+−+= rmr ccp  (4) 
Moreover, we can get *1D ,
*
1mΠ and *1rΠ by substituting mp1 and rp1 in m1Π , r1Π and 1D with *1mp
and *1rp ,
4/)))(((*1 rm ccD +−−= ωαβφ                     (5) 
))(8/()))((( 2*1 ωαβωαβφ −+−−=Π rmm cc  (6) 
))(16/()))((( 2*1 ωαβωαβφ −+−−=Π rmr cc  (7) 
From equations (3)-(7), we can get the proposition 1 directly. 
Proposition 1 In case I, i) If )/( ωβα < , then 0*1 >mp , 0*1 >rp , 0*1 >D , 0*1 >Π m and 0*1 >Π r . ii) 
If )/( ωβα > , then 0*1 <mp , 0*1 <rp , 0*1 <Π m and 0*1 <Π r , but 0*1 >D .
3.3 Price Decision for Case II. 
In this case, when making the price decision, the manufacturer will minus the payment which he should 
share in his profit function, and the retailer will minus the payment which her should share in her profit 
function, namely, 
).)(( 22222
2
rrrmmm
p
pppcpMax
m
ωαβφγα +−−−=Π (8) 
).
)()1((
22
2222
2
rr
rmrrrp
pp
ppcpMax
r
ωαβ
φαγ
+
−−−−−=Π
  (9) 
Use the same method as case I, the optimal results of the wholesale price and the retail price in case II 
are obtained: 
)).)(2(2(
/)))(2)((2( 2*2
ωαβγα
γαωαβφ
−−Δ
−Δ−−+Δ= rmm ccp   (10) 
)).)(2(4(
/))2)(()6((*2
ωαβγα
ωαβφγα
−−ΔΔ
Δ+−+Δ−Δ= rmr ccp   (11) 
Here αγ )1(1 −−=Δ .
From the above equations, we can get the following propositions easily. 
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Proposition 2 In case II, whenα is fixed, *2mp and *2rp decrease as γ decreases, *2D , *2mΠ and *2rΠ
increase as γ decreases.
Proposition 3 In case II, when γ is fixed, i) If )/( ωβα < , then 0*2 >mp , 0*2 >rp , 0*2 >D ,
0*2 >Π m and 0*2 >Π r . ii) If )/( ωβα > , then 0*2 <mp , 0*2 <rp , 0*2 <Π m and 0*2 <Π r , but 0*2 >D .
4. Numerical Analysis 
In this section, we present the numerical analysis of the optimal results via a numerical example. Here, 
let 10000=φ , 2=β , 100=mc , 20=rc , 3=ω .
4.1 Impacts ofα on the Optimal Results of Case I. 
If the subsidy depends on the retail price, the subsidized rate α will affect the price decisions and the 
profits. The following figures show us the changing of the wholesale price, the retail price, the new 
product demand, the profit of the manufacturer, and the profit of the retailer with different α .
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
4
x 104
α
W
ho
le
sa
le
 p
ric
e 
an
d 
re
ta
il p
ric
e
wholesale price
retail price
FIGURE 1. Changing of the wholesale price and retail price with differentα in case I
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FIGURE 2. Changing of the new product demand with differentα in case I 
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FIGURE 3. Profits changing of the manufacturer and retailer with differentα in case I 
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From the above figures, we can find the results: when )/( ωβα < , namely, 3/2<α , the wholesale 
price, the retailer price, the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of the retailer are positive; 
when 3/2>α , the wholesale price, the retailer price, the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of the 
retailer are negative; but the new product demand increases when α increases. 
4.2 Impacts of γ on the Optimal Results of Case II. 
Here, let 4.0=α . In this situation, the share ratio of the payment γ will affect the price decisions 
and the profits. The following figures show us the changing of the wholesale price, the retail price, the 
new product demand, the profit of the manufacturer, and the profit of the retailer with different γ .
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FIGURE 4. Changing of wholesale price, retail price and demand with different γ in case II 
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FIGURE 5. Profits changing of the manufacturer and the retailer with different γ in case II 
The above figures tell us the results: if 4.0=α , when the manufacturer’s share ratio of the payment 
decreases, the wholesale price and the retailer will decrease, the new product demand, the profits of the 
manufacturer and the retailer will increase. It means the manufacturer and the retailer can get more profit 
with the payment sharing method. 
4.3 Comparing the Optimal results of Two Cases. 
In order to compare the optimal results of two cases, we assume γ is fixed. Here, let 5.0=γ . The 
changing of the optimal results of two cases are shown as figure 6 and figure 7. 
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FIGURE 6. Changing of wholesale price, retail price and demand with differentα in two cases 
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FIGURE 7. Profits changing of the manufacturer and the retailer with differentα in two cases 
Figure 6 and figure 7 show us the results: i) if γ is fixed, when )/( ωβα < , namely, 3/2<α , the 
wholesale price, the retailer price, the profit of the manufacturer and the profit of the retailer in two cases 
are positive; when 3/2>α , the wholesale price, the retailer price, the profit of the manufacturer and the 
profit of the retailer in two cases are negative; the new product demand in case I will increase 
whenα increases while the new product demand in case II will decrease. ii) if γ is fixed, when 3/2<α ,
the wholesale price in case I is not smaller than the wholesale price in case II; the retail price in case I is 
not larger than the retail price in case II; the manufacturer’s profit in case I is not smaller than the 
manufacturer’s profit in case II; the retailer’s profit in case I is not smaller than the retailer’s profit in case 
II. 
5. Conclusions. 
In this paper, we studied the price decisions for the manufacturer and the retailer under two cases: case 
I, the government offers the financial subsidy which is depended on the retail price; case II, the 
government stops to offer the financial subsidy, the manufacturer will share the payment with the retailer. 
At the same time, we analyze the impacts of the subsidizing rate and the sharing ratio on the optimal 
results by a numerical example. 
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